OT and critical infrastructure

Detect what changes in the plant, without touching the plant.

LogLM understands how OT networks behave and flags the sequences that diverge, across industrial protocols and the IT telemetry around them. Vigil shows analysts the protocol operations behind each finding. Both run inside your boundary, on premises or fully air-gapped, with no cloud connection required.

Passive by design

Observes traffic and protocol operations. Issues no commands, joins no control loop.

No device rules

Behavioral detection surfaces concerning sequences without a signature written for each device.

Sovereign by default

Inference, findings, and investigation stay on infrastructure the operator controls.

Behavioral detection across critical infrastructureFour sectors of critical infrastructure drawn in line art along the bottom: a water plant, an electrical substation with transmission tower, a pipeline compressor station, and a manufacturing plant. Above each, a row of tokens represents the sequence of telemetry the facility generates. Within each row a short segment breaks the pattern and is drawn in red, labelled with the class of behavior LogLM flagged: an unauthorized write, a rogue endpoint, lateral movement, and a command sequence out of order.Telemetry as behavioral sequenceexpecteddivergent, flagged by LogLMUnauthorized register writeRogue endpointLateral movementOut-of-order commandsWaterPowerPipelinesManufacturing
Joint validation

Water-plant range, finalized PCAP, on-premises inference.

The Technology Advancement Center ran LogLM and Vigil against its WS3 water-plant range on an NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin. The results were eye opening. Despite not being trained on the environment, or using any signature based detections, DeepTempo saw the attack and Vigil provided a local AI model powered immediate investigation and response.

Rogue HMI-01
Attack identified with no preexisting rule, signature, fine-tuning, or adaptation
40,773
Canonical network flows processed from WS3 water-plant data
8,295
Semantic Modbus events preserved as first-class investigation evidence
Download the case study (PDF)

Full validation data, deployment boundary, and TAC's perspective.

The OT constraint

You cannot patch your way out, and you cannot phone home.

The defenses that work in IT assume conditions OT rarely offers. Controllers run for decades on firmware that cannot be updated without a maintenance window nobody wants to schedule. Networks are segmented, often air-gapped, and telemetry that leaves the plant is a liability, not a convenience.

Patching is rare and disruptive, not a Patch Tuesday.

Vulnerabilities persist for years. Detection has to work against the environment as it is, not as a hardening guide wishes it were.

Cloud connections are often unavailable or forbidden.

Vendor-hosted analytics that require telemetry egress do not fit regulated plants, defense ranges, or utilities under sovereignty mandates.

Signatures do not know your rogue HMI.

A malicious or misconfigured endpoint speaking well-formed protocol traffic looks legitimate to a rule. Its behavior over time does not.

Alerts without evidence stall the investigation.

Operators need to see the register reads and writes behind a concerning sequence before they act on it.

Approach

From telemetry to operator-ready evidence.

A fail-closed pipeline. Only accepted result bundles reach analysts, and the evidence behind each finding stays inspectable. The TAC validation ran it on finalized PCAP; the same pipeline accepts whatever telemetry your plant already produces.

1

Collect

Telemetry as you already gather it: packet captures, flow logs, protocol logs, SIEM or data lake exports. No agents on controllers.

2

Normalize

Telemetry is automatically normalized and ingested through the scale-out architecture of the Intelligent Defense Platform, with protocol operations preserved as semantic events.

3

Detect

LogLM scores sequences for divergence from expected network behavior, locally.

4

Accept

Result bundles verified before release. Nothing unverified reaches the queue.

5

Investigate

Vigil presents findings alongside the flows and protocol operations that produced them.

Intelligent Defense Platform

One model that detects. One workflow that explains.

LogLM

Detection

An encoder-only transformer foundation model trained across diverse security telemetry. It embeds sequences of network and protocol activity and classifies compound behavior, so a rogue endpoint is caught by what it does rather than by a rule someone wrote for it.

Zero-shot on new environments; no baselining period, no labels
Runs on a single edge GPU such as the Jetson AGX Orin, or scales on Kubernetes
Broad by design: industrial protocols and the surrounding IT telemetry, evaluated together

Vigil

Investigation

The leading open source AI SOC, Apache 2.0. Vigil is telemetry- and vendor-agnostic. It turns a LogLM finding into a case an operator can reason about: the flows, the protocol operations, the endpoints, and the timeline, with agentic workflows for investigation and response.

Protocol-level evidence as first-class objects, not opaque alerts
Bring your own models, rules, and integrations; inspect and extend the code
Feedback from analysts stays in your environment and improves your deployment
Validation spotlight

A rogue HMI, found by behavior alone.

TAC's vStrike range introduced a second HMI issuing competing commands, causing a simulated flow valve to fluctuate against the benign HMI. LogLM identified the sequences involving that endpoint as concerning with no preexisting rule, signature, fine-tuning, or adaptation, outperforming the alternatives TAC assessed.

Vigil then exposed the corresponding flows and Modbus operations, 120 register reads and 30 writes, for protocol-level review. vStrike supplied the ground truth independently: the endpoint LogLM flagged was the rogue.

98.95%
Model confidence in the anomaly verdict
EndpointRogue HMI-01
Modbus observations150
Register reads / writes120 / 30
Device-specific rule requiredNone

Confidence describes the anomaly verdict, not an attack probability. Standard deployment and pipeline configuration were still required.

Validation data

Accepted results from the WS3 water-plant range.

Metric
Accepted result
Canonical flows
40,773
Modbus observations (complete)
4,149 (4,143)
Semantic Modbus events
8,295
Behavioral findings
287
Parser warnings / malformed records
0 / 0
Independent-run semantic comparison
Identical
Persisted findings in Vigil, four TAC datasets
489

Results are specific to the named accepted artifacts from TAC's WS3 validation and are not general production guarantees. The onsite deployment processed finalized PCAPs in batches; continuous streaming inference and direct SCADA integration were not part of the validated scope.

DeepTempo is delivering a powerful analyst-assistant capability that adds true plant-operating-state semantic analysis, pairing its established IT analysis with meaningful, plant-aware OT analysis. Initial coverage centers on Modbus TCP monitoring and control traffic; near-term expansion to DNP3, EtherNet/IP, and other ICS protocols will give SOC teams significant coverage of critical infrastructure plant operations.

Steve Hutchinson, Director of Research, Technology Advancement Center
Deployment

The model travels to the data. The data stays where it is.

There is no hosted tier and no telemetry egress. Fleet-wide model improvements arrive as versioned artifacts you install on your own schedule.

On premises or fully air-gapped

Edge GPU or rack server inside the plant network. Proven on an NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin in the TAC validation.

Inside your existing data lake

Run LogLM where flow and protocol telemetry already lands, upstream of the SIEM, with up to 45% lower SIEM cost.

Bring your own cloud or Kubernetes

For operators with an approved private cloud, deploy into your tenancy under your controls.

Questions operators ask

Before you let anything near the plant.

Does it require a cloud connection?

No. LogLM inference, Vigil, and the findings store run inside your environment, including fully air-gapped sites. Nothing is sent to DeepTempo.

Does it interact with PLCs or the control loop?

No. Collection is passive. The platform observes traffic and protocol operations and issues no commands.

Which protocols and telemetry does it work with?

LogLM evaluates industrial protocol traffic together with the IT telemetry around it, and Vigil is agnostic to source and vendor. The TAC validation exercised Modbus TCP, with reads and writes preserved as semantic events; the platform is not limited to it.

Do we need to write a rule per device?

No. LogLM detects divergence in behavioral sequences. In the TAC validation it surfaced the rogue HMI with no device-specific rule, signature, or fine-tuning.

Can we start without changing anything in the plant?

Yes. An assessment runs against telemetry you already have. LogLM reports what it finds; you decide what comes next.

Start with the telemetry you already have.

Send packet captures or flow telemetry from one segment. We run LogLM against it and return the findings with the protocol evidence behind each one.